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PAULINE GRACE 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the operation of performance related pay (PRP) within two UK 
divisions of an industrial gases company. The more successful of these PRP schemes 
was introduced through partnership or ‘joint working’ between the trade union and 
management. However, even within this ‘forward thinking’ division, the reality of 
PRP fails to cohere with the rhetoric. This paper contends that the chasm owes to a 
combination of poor planning and informal local action. The methodology follows a 
critical case logic, with the inclusion of the exemplar division maximising the 
prospect that the reward system operates according to plan. From this division two 
lauded sub-units were selected - the best team from the south of England, and the 
corresponding highest performer in Scotland. Thus spatial diversity and the 
differential influence of local management can emerge. Data collection techniques 
included interviews with management, trade union leadership and employees, and 
open participant observation. Even in these recommended sites the original PRP 
rationale became muddied through myopic planning, self-serving action, and external 
forces. The scheme introduced under the banner of objectivity and openness was 
informally amended to allow subjectivity and stealth. In addition, front-line managers 
sought to reclaim local prerogative through the construction of discretionary bonuses. 
The shortcomings in the operation of PRP are however either obfuscated, or slow to 
emerge. Strong product markets shroud anomalies. Further, management has 
eschewed any rigorous evaluation of PRP. Much of the economic buoyancy has been 
attributed to the effective deployment of PRP. The data suggests that the role of PRP 
in the creation of value may be overstated. 
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THE LITERATURE 
There is a sizeable body of literature prescribing the uptake of Performance Related 
Pay (PRP) (Kanter, 1987; Schuster and Zingheim, 1992; Lawler 1995; Flannery, 
Hofrichter and Platten, 1996; Lundy and Cowling, 1996; Dessler, 2000). These 
writers believe that the advantages reaped include the alignment of organisation and 
employee goals, the synchronisation of payroll with company performance, the 
creation of high levels of teamwork, and the attainment of quality for the customer. 
Lawler (1995) also argues that a critical issue is the level of consistency between what 
organisations say and what they do. 
Legge (1995) however has questioned the depth to which such prescriptions are 
actually applied. She suggests that HRM associated ‘fads’ (p. 40) are being used by 
“interested parties seeking legitimacy and survival in a changed and increasingly 
competitive world” (p. 34). Brown and Walsh (1994) have considered the 
manipulations that thwart payment by results systems. In particular they draw 
attention to two defects of an operational nature. The first is that employees may opt 
to maintain harmonious relations with their colleagues rather than maximise their 
individual earnings. Others have similarly suggested that employees will place 
informal restrictions on effort, even when the net effect is to neutralise the incentive 
payment (Whyte, 1955). The second impediment that Brown and Walsh (1994) enlist 
is where an outside variable, such as a technological circumstance, may cause some 
jobs to be ‘slacker’ than others and results in employees earning different amounts 
regardless of individual effort. The risk is that management and workers then try to 
make amends through ‘constant fragmented bargaining’ (p. 456). Thus the pay, and 
production system, loses its original rationale. Lupton (1963) identified a 
phenomenon whereby managers choose not to utilise their power in a bid to retain 
cordial relations with workers. Echoing Gouldner’s (1955) conceptualisation of the 
‘indulgency pattern’, managers may believe that the fostering of casual friendliness is 
beneficial to the speedy resolution of conflict. Child (1972) points to the fact that 
organisation decision-making is essentially “a political process in which constraints 
and opportunities are functions of the power exercised by decision-makers in the light 
of ideological values.” (p. 16). Thus, a recurring theme is that the formulation, 
operation and review of organisational activities are likely to be stymied unless 
sufficient heed is paid to the political processes to which they are intrinsically bound 
(Selznick 1949; Gouldner 1955; Burns and Stalker 1961; Blau 1964 and Pfeffer 
1981). 
Lupton (1963) has considered how power struggles can be made manifest through 
incentive pay schemes. Lupton’s work, based on the piece rate system, suggested that 
incentive pay, as practised, differs from that as planned. Manipulations occur, not 
least because management tacitly allow loopholes to continue unplugged. 
Management may believe that informality is a superior way of handling any conflict 
that does arise though workers may disagree. Later work by Lupton (1972) points to 
management inability, conflicting manager/worker interests and power fluctuations as 
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sources of performance deficits. These factors, combined with ‘product and labour 
market forces’ (p. 10) will defeat any attempts to link effort to reward. 
This paper contends that the current notion of performance related pay provides 
equally fertile ground for power struggles and political activity. The following section 
presents two case studies that focus on incentive pay. Whilst the shape of the pay 
systems may have changed the polemical nature of variable pay has not. 
 
THE RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This research considers the extent to which PRP, as articulated, actually translates to 
the shop floor level. If divergences do occur, to what do they owe their origin? The 
deliberate use of the rhetoric of PRP by management to serve symbolic motives 
(Ahlstrand, 1990)? Or is performance pay being used ‘pragmatically and 
opportunistically’ as Legge (1995: 40) suggested? Whether the operation of PRP 
reflects company strategy or is simply the amalgam of disjointed and incremental 
actions will be considered. 
 
Research Methodology 
This research first considers the shape of PRP as devised at a senior level within two 
divisions of an industrial gases company. The first division (Gasco Industrial) 
highlights the fragility of PRP. In this case the PRP scheme experienced a relatively 
rapid demise. The scheme in this division will be contrasted with the second (Gasco 
Steadyflow) where the negotiated staff agreement and concomitant payment system 
has been widely commended. This second case allows us scope to compare the 
scheme as pronounced with the scheme in practice. The methodology follows a 
critical case logic. In choosing an ‘exemplary’ division one is maximising the 
possibility that the reward system operates according to plan. By corollary, if it 
doesn’t meet its claims in this ‘best practice’ division it is unlikely to do so elsewhere. 
In this model division the PRP scheme (or ‘Staff Agreement’) works through the 
‘Service Area Team’ unit. Across the UK there are twelve teams, each of which 
comprises 15 to 20 employees. The ‘best’ of these teams became, in turn, the unit of 
study. In addition, given the influence of local ‘product and labour market forces’ 
(Lupton, 1963) on the effort/reward equation, it was deemed prudent to select a 
second Service Area Team that would represent a different labour and product 
market. Hence the best team from the southern region, and the corresponding highest 
performer in the north were selected. This mix would provide spatial diversity, and 
also elucidate the differential influence of the local line manager. 
Data collection methods included attendance at company meetings, interviews 
with senior management, trade union leadership, middle management and employees, 
analysis of company documentation, and open participant observation with 
employees. The total data collection period extended from 1997 to 2003. 
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PRP IN GASCO INDUSTRIAL: A SYSTEM WITHOUT STEAM 
Gasco Industrial, the main fabrication and cylinder business, has a history of 
paternalist management. Industrial managers in the UK also admitted to a culture that 
values task-focused behaviour, risk-aversion and caution. Notwithstanding 
management's fondness for the lexicon of ‘employee empowerment’, Industrial’s 
decision-making continues to be directed from the top. According to the HR Manager, 
the “culture is such that any change will be driven in once a target and milestones 
have been signed off”. Gasco Industrial has a high level of union membership with 
relations between management and unions tending toward the ‘adversarial’. The 
fragmented nature of this division’s pay systems in 1997 reflected the ad hoc manner 
in which they had grown up. The variable portion of the payroll posed particular 
discomfort for managers. This component comprised a host of frequently obscure 
payments, bonuses and incentives. There was no direct or certain link between 
company profitability and variable pay. The spread between high performers’ and low 
performers’ pay was limited, with most clustered around a central median. As the HR 
Manager dryly remarked, “all Industrial employees are above-average employees”. 
The former bonus schemes resulted in ‘moderate reward’ being delivered to everyone. 
“This was in part because results and effort were muddled in together”. 
Plans for a new comprehensive scheme were launched, the aim being “to ensure 
reward supports [the] achievement of new business strategy … [and a] move towards 
a more entrepreneurial business”. A new ‘more results led’ PRP system was to put 
across the message that “there are good years and bad years … and the company is 
not responsible for poor years or external factors”. The new scheme related pay to 
performance based on two aspects of profitability. The greatest of these elements 
would link pay to the achievement of targets in that part of the business over which 
the individual had most direct influence. Pay matrices were constructed which 
allowed employees to see how different achievement levels triggered differential pay 
levels. Management believed that these, combined with frequent review meetings, 
would allow workers to ‘adjust their effort or behaviour’ on a ‘timely’ basis 
(Corkerton and Bevan, 1998: 42). 
When Gasco Industrial managers selected the groups to whom performance pay 
would apply they chose cohorts who were already receiving some form of incentive 
payment. They ‘took and reworked the existing bonus money’. The HR Manager 
described this tactical selection process as ‘priming the pump’. Further these groups 
of workers had a ‘commercial element’ to their work. The initiative was launched on 
a phased basis. Five PRP schemes, encompassing 300 employees in total, were run 
initially. The profit figure was to be reserved. This was to allow scope for 
manipulation should 'winners' not be naturally forthcoming in the year of inception. 
Management was determined that the pilot group should be treated to a 'win' (or 
financial gain) in their first year of participation. This was a result that management 
would contrive to keep those affected agreeable. These early participants could then 
pass on 'strong positive feedback' to the wider workforce. At senior levels however 
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the process was less certain. The unpredictability of future resources proved 
debilitating, as the HR manager had to implement the scheme without knowing the 
total funding that would b released. The HR manager further reveals that he felt time 
pressures. He wanted to ‘write the HR strategy first’, but the managing director 
insisted that PRP was promptly launched. “I had to try to get the strategy developed 
so that it was always just one step ahead of the PRP scheme”. He refers to the ‘stress’ 
he felt in the first few weeks on the job as he tried to persuade the managing director 
to slow the process. This manager also found the roles he was delegated frustrating. “I 
was designing it [the PRP system] and yet would have also to implement it and use 
it… I was change agent and customer wrapped up in one”. 
 
Early ‘winners’ 
In 1998 Gasco Industrial management began their first assessment of the scheme. As 
the HR manager commented the workers now ‘know down to the pound’ what they're 
owed from the scheme. Management involved opined that the performance pay 
scheme impacted positively on bottom line profits. They were also keen to claim that 
the workforce was refocused towards business goals. However the planned ‘roll out’ 
of the scheme never occurred. The HR Manager charged with the design of the 
system acknowledges in retrospect that this would have always been difficult. As 
mentioned, management had launched PRP with groups of workers for whom there 
already existed bonuses or surplus resources. This tactic yielded ‘the winners’ that 
they desired. However it would render the project considerably more difficult as it 
spread to cohorts for whom there was no surfeit or ‘pot’ to re-package into PRP. 
Furthermore for all participants to the scheme subsequent years were to see the 
inclusion of thresholds that would place ‘hurdles’ in the path of performance pay. 
Nonetheless the HR Manager opines that the second year worked out ‘reasonably 
well’. ‘Not many failed on thresholds. However there was just generally poorer 
business’. At the same time this HR manager left this post and the ‘Reward and 
Recognition’ project became jaded. One of this manager’s biggest regrets was that the 
non-financial or 'recognition' element of the project failed to materialise thus leaving 
the reward strategy considerably less rounded than originally envisaged. 
 
The aftermath 
Following the departure of the HR Manager from Industrial, a new management team 
set about establishing a fresh PRP scheme, ‘Rewarding Success’. This group of 
managers demanded that ‘wider measures of individual success and effort’ be 
recognised. Unlike its predecessor this scheme was to take into consideration 
‘external market levels’ and the individual employee’s ‘contribution’. Bonus payment 
levels were based on financial measures, plus a sum reflecting achievement of 
‘Individual Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)’. Management had discretion over the 
latter. ‘Eligibility’ to the scheme included many middle management roles. Without 
any rigorous assessment to date, managers express confidence that this scheme is 
  
THE LEARNING, INNOVATION AND KNOWLEDGE (LINK) RESEARCH CENTRE WORKING PAPER SERIES 
WP 01-06 
http://www.link.dcu.ie/publications/workingpaperseries/ 
© 2006, LInK, Pauline Grace 
Contact: pauline.grace@dcu.ie 
8 
successful. The trade unions were not involved in either of the Gasco Industrial PRP 
projects. 
 
The ‘Inevitable’ Demise of Incentive Schemes 
In Gasco Industrial decision-makers appear eager to blaze brisk but triumphant trails 
with HR initiatives. The manager who designed the ‘Reward and Recognition’ 
scheme acknowledges that they contrived to create early ‘winners’ on the scheme. 
The net effect of the managerial action was to front-load the success. The HR 
manager admits with hindsight that the ‘roll out’ to other sites was always going to be 
more difficult. Subsequent managers were disinclined to rejuvenate or to nurture 
schemes launched by others. It could be argued that management discontinuity might 
precipitate PRP demise. 
 
External factors 
Lupton (1963) argued that the operation of payment systems could not be viewed in 
isolation of economic circumstances. The effect of the declining market in which 
Gasco Industrial is operating is not insignificant. The first PRP system was, according 
to later managers, insufficiently flexible to cope with changing economic conditions. 
Strictly linked to company revenue it failed to provide pay-outs when company 
performance dipped. Under the dictum of ‘increasing discretion’ the revised PRP 
scheme recognised ‘effort’ as well as ‘results’. Hence the objective of making 
employees ‘more entrepreneurial’ was effectively turned on its head. Perhaps telling 
is the fact that managers themselves formed a large cohort of participants in the PRP 
scheme. Management engaged the services of a consultant, who, upon undertaking a 
‘review’ in 2001 gave the imprimatur to the revised scheme. Thus the original 
rationale, the fostering of entrepreneurship, was muddied through subsequent 
reactions both to external forces and internal politics. 
 
Summary 
In Gasco Industrial, new management and new market realities signalled the end of 
PRP. A moot point is whether these were the correct factors to instigate a fresh PRP 
system, or whether the original scheme should not have been sufficiently robust to 
survive such contextual change. 
The following section considers ‘Steadyflow’, the exemplar division within 
Gasco. According to Steadyflow’s director, the division is, in CBI terms, ‘best in 
class’ on many measures including management of absenteeism and staff turnover. 
From the outset Gasco management “wanted to do something different with 
Steadyflow”. The director of Steadyflow claims that Steadyflow “was always 
consciously used as a leading edge business”. Accolades have also come from the 
trade union, from external consultants and also from other companies operating within 
the industry. 
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STEADYFLOW: THE ‘FORWARD THINKING’ SITES 
Since the early 1990s Steadyflow supplies gas to the hospitality and leisure trade 
(‘pubs ‘n clubs’). Though wholly owned by Gasco, Steadyflow has its own profit 
targets and also has freedom from the Gasco business pay structure. People within the 
Steadyflow division consider themselves first as ‘Steadyflow people’ and see their 
membership within Gasco as secondary. Employing 300 staff, this worksite originally 
began as a non-unionised venture. In 1994 however one of the main trade unions 
entered negotiations with management. In the course of its existence Steadyflow has 
spawned a distinct culture. Demarcations that existed in Gasco's other businesses have 
been collapsed in Steadyflow, for example drivers will engage in the loading of 
products. However before agreement could be reached on a new reward system 
mistrust lingering from previous variable systems had to be dealt with. For example, 
employees complained that the earlier bonus system was ‘fixed by management’. 
Also the due payout was not always forthcoming. Management, for their part, found 
the earlier system ‘tremendously complicated’. 
It was agreed that management and the trade union would ‘jointly establish a 
workable performance pay system’. Parameters and principles were laid out in 
advance of negotiations. ‘Appraisal driven pay’ was to be eschewed. The trade union 
was adamant that issues of behaviour, competency and staff development were left to 
the appraisal system. In turn, management stipulated that the new pay system was 
‘driven by business objectives’. The union endorsed the proposed scheme with the 
comment that ‘the scheme consists of straight-forward key factors’. The union has 
been described as an ‘advocate’ of the system. Much of the ‘success’ is attributed to 
the ‘joint working’ process behind the PRP agreement. Both parties concerned argue 
that this is a departure from traditional negotiation. They cite the low number of 
‘break out’ meetings that occurred. The cessation of the ritualistic ‘bidding up’ 
process was also referenced. The Steadyflow director remained involved throughout 
the formulation of the pay system. He sought to project a ‘consultative’ style of 
management. He expressed the fear, however, that a change of personalities could 
disrupt progress. “If the worst came to the worst, and if we got a dinosaur from the 
trade union, the whole thing could become undone”. 
In the Steadyflow division there are two main categories of worker. These are the 
sales and driving staff, and the production staff who fill the containers. Both groups of 
worker are included in the new performance pay scheme. This stands in contrast with 
the performance pay in Gasco Industrial where managers, sales staff and marketing 
people are included, but it stops short of industrial staff and drivers. 
The new agreement articulated a series of ‘key objectives’. These included the 
need to ‘support communication of the key business objectives’ and to ‘motivate’ 
staff to achieve these objectives. Echoing the mantra of the prescriptive literature, the 
rewards were to be ‘sufficient to provide incentive for measurable performance 
improvement’. The pay-outs should be ‘able to be influenced by individuals’. 
However the new agreement also shifted the attention from input measures onto the 
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achievement of actual results such as ‘revenue and profit targets’. It argued that staff 
should not be paid ‘just for trying hard’. The scheme was to be ‘as simple and 
objective as possible’. It ‘should be consistent ... [and] transparent’. The bedrock was 
that “PRP should be based on an automatic, formula based assessment of measurable 
outputs”. 
 
Arch-approval 
Those who drew up the staff agreement claim that PRP has delivered. For 
management this system has not resulted in a spiralling payroll. Roughly two percent 
of profits are paid out as part of this scheme. The trade union leader is content with 
payouts that can still ‘mount up to an extra £1000 and sometimes more’. Further the 
trade union expresses satisfaction that ‘full and proper collective bargaining’ remains 
intact. According to the union negotiator ‘the employees get the best of both worlds’, 
that is, distributed profits plus negotiated increases. The business director believes 
that it is ‘not a coincidence’ that market share has grown. He attributes this to 
combination of greater efficiencies and the PRP scheme. This is the Steadyflow PRP 
initiative as experienced by the decision-makers – an inclusive process with a 
mutually beneficial outcome. But what of the practice at ground level? The following 
section presents data on the operation of PRP within two of its most progressive 
‘teams’. 
 
TEAM ONE: ‘SOTTON’, SOUTH OF ENGLAND 
Sotton is the largest account base that Gasco Steadyflow has. There is also strong 
competition in this area, coming through vertical integration from breweries and from 
independent gas suppliers. The regional manager describes Sotton as “a very forward 
thinking team”. However underneath the promulgation of Sotton as an exemplar site 
there are contentious issues. 
In practice the individual portion of performance pay is widely considered to be 
both simple in its calculation and transparent in its operation. For example, the top 
performing service person (‘Sales and Service Person’ or ‘SSP’) spoke of his ability 
to track his performance and bonus payment over the course of the year. But he also 
notes that there are forces beyond the individual’s control at work, some of which can 
be fortuitous. “You’ve to build your revenue ten percent extra on last year’s 
performance. It helps if Gasco have put their prices up also!” However the Sotton 
foreman points to internal issues that thwart the link between effort and reward. He 
cites the differential earning capacities of different areas.  
 
“Every year the target is ten percent up on the last years. In the towns there’s 
no problem. But the SSPs in the country areas have to make long drives to get 
to their accounts. ... So it’s a bit unfair as I’ve said many a time … But that’s 
the way and our union have agreed to it”.  
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The best performing team member concurs that the Steadyflow staff agreement is ‘a 
poor one’. “It was a soft deal they negotiated with Gasco management and the trade 
union. It’s all one way. In management’s favour”. 
Whilst the central pillar to Steadyflow’s PRP scheme is the measure of revenue 
growth, Steadyflow management subsequently contrived that this would not be the 
sole mechanism for gauging staff. Thus a parallel area-wide scheme requires that data 
are compiled on a range of measures including the number of emergency calls service 
staff dealt with, the levels of bad debt they incur and the time it takes them to return 
customer calls. Thus management sought influence over the manner in which revenue 
was grown. However not all staff were attuned to the machinations of these ancillary 
schemes, and some expressed resentment at their existence. A case in point is the 
leading service person who, although satisfied with his PRP bonus, is disgruntled with 
a co-existing bonus scheme. Referring to a prize of a VIP day out at Arsenal football 
club won by a new employee, he complains ‘What’s the point if no one knows what 
the prize was for? No one knew what they were meant to do to win it. It rubbed a lot 
of the men up the wrong way’. He is additionally embittered by the fact that he was 
the individual who came out first on the formal scheme, but was insufficiently 
recognised for this. He comments that he would like to apply for the vacant post of 
second ‘team leader’, but intimates that this exercise would be in vain. 
 
“There’s a job of team leader coming up again here in Sotton, but I don’t 
know if there is any point in me going for it … I think they already know who 
they want for it … it’s all stitched up in advance.” 
 
This same service person, who has been with Gasco ten years, is described by his 
foreman as ‘very laid back’. However his frustration with Gasco, the management and 
most particularly the reward scheme is palpable. Conscious of his frequent 
disillusioned comments about Steadyflow, and the reward and promotion system, he 
adds, “You probably think that I’m jaded … Yeah, very cynical.” 
‘Team working’ appears to be rather less systematic than touted by senior 
management. For example, a practice emerged in Sotton whereby the men opted to 
postpone emergency calls received on Fridays. These calls would be picked up by the 
individual roistered to carry out weekend cover work. It was only when Saturday 
became inextricably burdened did the men ‘sit down together’ and decide that 
‘enough was enough’. Co-operation across teams is also variable, with Sotton just 
recently ‘offloading’ a ‘problematic’ employee onto an adjacent satellite depot. In 
Sotton there is also resentment of management’s top-down style. The foreman notes 
that in the past when he has tried to raise controversial issues, which he has been met 
‘company-speak’ such as ‘let’s park it for now’ and ‘it’s a non-negotiable’. 
The staff in Sotton are very conscious of the high cost of living in the south of 
England. It is a perennial issue in their discourse. Differentials in salaries both across 
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the divisions and across the regions are also frequently referenced. One service person 
opined that ‘The London staff are paid more. The Solmadie staff should be paid less!’  
 
Summary  
Perhaps ironically, the individualism and resolve nurtured by the PRP scheme was 
muted by the institution of an ancillary bonus scheme that inspired disaffection and 
splits. This applied even to the employee who was the biggest beneficiary from the 
principal scheme. 
 
TEAM TWO: ‘SOLMADIE’, SCOTLAND 
Business in the Solmadie area has recently received a boost due to the decision of one 
of the breweries to shed its gas supply constituent, and contract it to Steadyflow. 
Further, the front line manager at Solmadie believes he has fostered a productive team 
through his informal management techniques. 
However fractures exist. The feeling that Gasco management fails to listen to its 
staff is evident. The ‘best performing’ SSP believes that the lack of staff consultation 
is costing the company through less informed and effective decisions. For example, he 
believes that the logistics across the sales regions could be improved. “The problem is 
that when you go to Steadyflow meetings or management training and raise these 
issues, they’ll all nod and agree with you … Someone is blocking the change, but it is 
never clear who”. This worker believes that much apparent ineptitude and illogical 
decision-making in Gasco is due to organisational politics. “When you don’t 
understand why something is as it is, it’s rooted in politics”. This Solmadie service 
person relates how he was adversely affected by mismanagement of the PRP scheme. 
As a PRP participant, he grew his territory in line with the targets set, ultimately 
outperforming other members of his team. However on foot of this triumphant first 
year’s performance, he was taken off his allocated territory and ‘given a harder plot’. 
This re-assignment was recognised by all on the team as being substantially more 
difficult. Not only were the new areas considered ‘tougher’, but also they were 
geographically dispersed, giving him the additional connecting distances to drive. 
When he voiced his dissatisfaction to his managers, they tried to placate him by 
taking out a map to demonstrate that the locations were ‘not far apart’. (The service 
person argues that even on the map, “it is a significant four inches”). In relation to 
management’s recourse to the map and their rejoinder he sighs that “if management 
say that what chance do you have? I give up.” This year this high performing service 
person expects to get only half of his ‘due PRP’, that is £1,500 instead of £3,000. He 
suspects that the re-allocation of sales territories was concealed from higher 
management. “They [senior management] don’t know what happened at regional 
level. It was kept in-house, cos it’s seen as a mess”. He reveals his suspicions as to the 
background to the reallocation. 
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“What happened was that another SSP [Sales and Service Person]… went to 
[middle] management and said that they had too much work … This person 
also identified __________ [a remote area]… So instead of giving me more of 
[the city] I was pushed out to cover ___________ as well”.  
 
This SSP points out that he will not publicise his withdrawal of full effort. Nor will he 
seek redress in relation to what he considers the iniquitous response to his previous 
year’s achievement.  
 
“I don’t want to rock the boat in relation to my pay. Although I think that it’s 
unfair. I don’t want to be seen as a troublemaker … but even the rest of the 
lads at the depot thought that it was unfair”.  
 
This SSP candidly reveals that both his motivation and performance have diminished 
as a result. “I’ve put on the brakes, in terms of my effort at work. I’ve said this to my 
manager, who acted surprised. Now I’ll do only as much as the other lads”. This best 
performing SSP has in the past been forthcoming with suggestions to enhance 
company profit levels. Following ‘the Christmas period’ he was due to take up the 
additional role of promoter within Solmadie of ‘balloons and helium’. However at this 
point, if he could relinquish this responsibility he avowed that he would.  
 
The Solmadie manager is dissatisfied with the calculation of the area-component of 
PRP. 
 
“Some of the area’s bonus money for PRP was blocked because of financial 
mis-management, following a share slump. However although the problem 
was not actually in the Steadyflow accounts, Steadyflow had to pick up the 
pieces, and the men lost £200 each”.  
 
The Solmadie manager decided not to tell his staff of this error “or there’d be riots”. 
He is also dissatisfied with the non-release of the PRP results. “I had a big run in with 
the director … He wouldn’t announce the best team in the PRP awards. His reasoning 
was that he didn’t want to incite envy or competition across the sites.” This was a 
poor justification in the view of the Solmadie manager who complained “why bother 
getting ‘best in class’ if it won’t be recognised”. The area manager feels that senior 
management is out of touch with the operational side of the business. “The higher up 
the tree you go, the closer to the clouds you get”. He operates his own informal, 
somewhat unorthodox, incentive scheme. For example he bought “a £750 half cut 
diamond ring to give to the partner of the best performer”. On a night out, he passed 
the ring around in a bid to alert the partners of the prize that it was in the offing. He 
believes that the work productivity duly rose within the team. “When it became a race 
between the top four or five the others went back to the normal rate of working…” He 
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was nonetheless happy with the initial ‘spur’ that it gave the staff. In the course of his 
informal ‘networking’ within the Steadyflow division the Solmadie manager 
discovered that two other middle managers were on higher rates of remuneration. He 
has threatened to resign. Although he concedes that it is fact hyperbole to register his 
disaffection. 
The basic pay of foremen is set at a higher level to SSPs. In addition they receive 
a PRP payment which is a proxy of the average of the team bonus. Some feel that this 
cumulative pay should be pitched at a higher level. The best performing SSP at 
Solmadie asks, “Where’s the incentive to be in management?” Equally the Solmadie 
foreman believes that the premise that foremen can indirectly influence their bonus, 
via the productivity of their team, is unrealistic.  
 
“The idea is that they will coach all men up to the level of exceeding, but 
sometimes there is nothing that you can do. For example, if someone just has 
the attitude of not caring less”.  
 
Despite the discontent that the PRP system engendered, this team continues to turn in 
a strong profit performance. The withdrawal of local competition may not be 
incidental. 
In both of the extolled sites it was seen that the PRP practised differed from that 
set out in company documentation. The following section discusses this divergence.  
 
PRP in Steadyflow: Transforming ‘winners’ into ‘losers’? 
The simplicity and transparency of the individual aspect of Steadyflow’s standardised 
PRP scheme allows employees to track their reward. However in both sites local and 
ancillary bonus schemes were created. Front line managers and supervisors may seek 
to re-assert their control over reward and the adjudication of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
Further by personalising the reward the Solmadie manager afforded himself access 
into the private sphere of the men’s lives, which he deems important in his creation of 
an intimate workplace. The existence of a parallel area bonus scheme in Sotton 
fostered dissatisfaction and jealousies. The negligible monetary amount involved 
appears irrelevant. In brief, a multiplicity of bonus schemes may diffuse focus and 
dissipate the original rationale. Senior management remain either oblivious, or 
unconcerned. Steadyflow lacks the comprehensive overview required to reveal these 
anomalies. 
Steadyflow management appears unwilling to exploit opportunities for staff 
‘recognition’. The Solmadie area manager is bewildered and annoyed by the refusal 
of senior managers to disclose the success of his team. This may be to avoid 
internecine rivalry, as indicated. It is also plausible that the non-disclosure of 
performance rankings allows management to retain prerogative on staff appointments. 
For example, the highest performing SSP recognises that he is not ‘the sort’ that 
Steadyflow wants to promote. Even though the Steadyflow system was designed with 
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the explicit aim of minimising subjectivity, we can see that in practice management 
prerogative prevails. This may be exercised through the allocation of sales territories. 
Further, it has been suspected that lobbying or pressure from individual SSPs may be 
enough to persuade front-line managers to use such discretion. 
The propensity of service personnel to concentrate on revenue to the neglect of the 
service element exists within Steadyflow’s PRP scheme. This is exacerbated by the 
expanding customer base, which puts additional strain on staff. As the service person 
in Sotton revealed it is not in his interest to provide coaching to customers on product 
use. This would distract from his raw mission to sell. The erosion of the service 
element places Gasco into the same league as its competitors, who compete on the 
basis of price not service. Given that Gasco prices are higher this is not a recipe for 
long term viability. 
As one service person indicated, the objectives of service staff and foremen can 
also be at odds. When covering for their ‘team’ members there is no incentive for the 
foremen to make more than a superficial replacement of cylinders. The consequence 
of this is that more runs have ultimately to be taken at a cost to Steadyflow. As was 
clear in Sotton the interests of individuals within the ‘team’ may also conflict. Service 
staff are keen to minimise their hours (especially since the annualising of overtime). 
Hence they may prefer to offload emergency calls onto weekend staff. Emergency 
calls are rarely as beneficial in revenue terms as the routing is more chaotic and thus 
uneconomical. 
The best performing newcomer at Solmadie resolved, that following his 
disadvantageous reallocation of territory, that rather than confront his managers he 
would reduce his work output. Thus the perceived inequity was redressed at the level 
of the individual. His decision not to express his grievance formally was based on his 
reluctance to earn a ‘bad name’. This reflects the practice that has developed within 
Steadyflow whereby conflict is not dealt with through union channels. The origins of 
this appear to be a combination of the apparent aloofness of the trade union 
(copperfastened by their shows of intimacy with management at leadership level), but 
also a perception by employees that the ‘professionalism’ of the Steadyflow business 
would be compromised by recourse to the union. Thus conflicts that arose were dealt 
with through clandestine means, or not at all. 
Brown (1962) makes the point that management frequently fails to comprehend 
the motivations of employees to work productively without a ‘carrot’ dangling in 
front of them. Thus they perhaps mistakenly overstate the role of incentive pay when 
units perform effectively. It is plausible that much of Steadyflow’s successful 
performance is rooted within the unique culture of customer commitment (perhaps 
despite the PRP?), alloyed with the benign market. The role of PRP in the creation of 
value may be overstated. 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrates that, even in relatively successful workplaces, the rhetoric 
and the reality of PRP may diverge. Schemes introduced under the banner of 
objectivity, and openness are informally amended to allow subjectivity and stealth. In 
the Industrial division there may have been pressure to appease managers who 
experienced a drop in PRP when company performance slumped. In Gasco 
Steadyflow front-line managers and supervisors sought to devise informal systems of 
sanction and reward. It may, in practice, be naïve to assume that company-wide 
standards and sanction suffice. Judiciously used global and local reward schemes may 
co-exist. However to the recipients of payouts or prizes it should not sully the worth 
of their achievements or send confusing signals as to what are valued behaviours. 
This paper contends that the chasm between the rhetoric and reality of PRP 
evidenced owes to a combination of poor planning and informal local action. 
However such fractures are frequently obfuscated, or slow to emerge. Through 
tradition and volition, employees in Gasco Steadyflow have rendered latent the 
sanctions that the Industrial division use to exert influence with management. Thus 
discontentment with the PRP system remains unresolved. It may be argued that these 
grievances will remain dormant as long as Gasco Steadyflow performs well. However 
should the level of performance pay plunge frustrations could erupt. 
In conclusion, even the high performing ‘teams’ within the successful division 
evince the incoherence of company plans and actual practices. The gap between the 
rhetoric and the operation appears wedged apart by an amalgam of factors from 
myopic planning, through to manipulative and self-serving action, to external 
economic forces. Against this, strong product markets may shroud shortcomings in 
the original design and implementation. Any rigorous attempt by management to 
evaluate PRP schemes or establish causality is eschewed. Success is attributed to the 
deployment of PRP. Against this PRP ‘failures’ rarely invite questioning of the 
appropriateness of PRP. Rather the expiration of existing plans becomes simply a 
clarion call for similar schemes. 
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